Gemini CLI's 0.61 nightly adds a confirmation gate when untrusted context attempts to modify build files or introduce untrusted flags. A companion sandbox patch tightens filesystem boundaries, credential handling, symbolic-link checks and runtime-state isolation. This is a nightly pre-release, so the behavior is evidence of Google's security direction rather than a stable interface.
Gemini CLI nightly adds a gate against build-file prompt injection
Gemini CLI's 0.61 nightly adds a confirmation gate when untrusted context attempts to modify build files or introduce untrusted flags. A companion sandbox patch tightens filesystem boundaries, credential handling, symbolic-link checks and runtime-state isolation. This is a nightly pre-release, so the behavior is evidence of Google's security direction rather than a stable interface.
Availability: nightly GitHub release; no stable 0.61 release in this scan window
Imported from the existing research archive. Migration preserves the recorded judgment and is not a fresh verification.
What this means for you
For teams evaluating coding agents, build files and tool flags are high-leverage paths from untrusted repository content to command execution. The new gate is worth tracking and adversarially testing, but production policy should wait for a stable release and documented guarantees.
Evidence & related material
Technical details & scores
| Release | v0.61.0-nightly.20260912.g9c1b0a610; published 2026-09-12T01:25:00Z; pre-release |
|---|---|
| Prompt Injection Gate | PR #29250 adds confirmation and blocking behavior for indirect prompt injection through modified build files and untrusted flags |
| Sandbox Hardening | PR #29214 tightens filesystem boundaries, credential exposure, symlink handling and runtime-state isolation |
| Availability | nightly GitHub release; no stable 0.61 release in this scan window |