Summary
ASLEval measures privacy exposure across every declared user-visible exit in a tool-using agent session, anchored to a hidden target set and explicit authorization. In the reported enterprise-style environments, checking only the expected output channel misses 46.9% of exposure found by the union of visible exits. Attacker self-reports both omit real leaks and add false discoveries. Reducing model-visible tool returns changes the leakage path but can also destroy normal task success.
Why it matters
For teams testing agents with email, consoles and external tools, a clean final answer does not prove the session preserved privacy. Evaluation should enumerate every visible boundary, define who is authorized to receive each target and report utility with leakage. The framework is early and needs public artifacts plus independent runtime reproduction.
Technical details
| Concept | privacy exposure displacement between a local proxy and target-grounded session exposure |
|---|---|
| Boundary | union of all declared requester-visible and external exits |
| Miss Rate | expected-outlet-only checks miss 46.9% of exposure recovered by the visible-exit union |
| Ground Truth | pre-registered hidden target set plus explicit authorization relation |
| Tradeoff | reducing model-visible returns can reduce utility |
Tags
ASLEvalagent-securityprivacyevaluationtool-use